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I N U.S. POLITICS, INTEREST GROUPS AND RESEARCH institutes have served as important sources of policy proposals for members of Congress and the execu-
tive branch. The nation's porous political system's institu-
tional fragmentation contains numerous "veto points" at 
which organized interests can modify and even block legis-
lation they dislike. Interest groups can enter the fray during 
the multiple points of the legislative process. They can lobby 
the executive branch at federal and state levels to modify the 
rules governing the implementation of a law. They can chal-
lenge a law in the courts. 
T ime and again, interest groups have blocked the 
enactment of health policies. Repeated failed efforts by poli-
ticians to expand health care coverage to the American 
people in the twentieth century is a case in point, as associa-
tions representing health care providers, insurers, employ-
ers, and even senior ci tizens succeeded in blocking or 
repealing such laws. However formidable organized inter-
ests are in the policy process, they are neither impregnable 
nor static. On the contrary, their policy preferences and 
policy influence can and do change as conditions in the 
economy and in the health care sector change. Coalitions in 
favor of or opposed to the expansion of health insurance, 
and national health insurance in particular, have changed in 
both their composition and strength. Although interest 
groups successfully opposed Democratic and Republican 
presidents' efforts to introduce universal government health 
insurance, in some cases they have supported the creation of 
public insurance programs for particular segments of the 
population or the expansion of private insurance under the 
shadow of government sponsorship. 
The health care arena has become a dynamic and 
increasingly crowded policy field with a bewildering array 
of stakeholders seeking to influence policymakers. Until 
the 1960s, the number of interest groups in health policy 
was small and concentrated, and thei r positions were 
fairly constant and predictable. Since then, new interest 
groups have entered the arena, many of them focused on 
fai rly narrow concerns of their members. This teeming 
environment reflects broader changes in the interest 
group landscape, with the explosion in the number of 
interest groups associated with social movements of the 
1960s and 1970s. It also highl ights the mobilization of new 
health care stakeholders in reaction to the growing role of 
the federal and state governments in health care financing 
and provision following the enactment of Medicare and 
Medicaid in 1965. 
The overarching lines of conflict in U.S. health policy 
have been over the balance between public and private, or 
government and market, fo rces in health care financing 
and provision. These battle lines were d rawn in the early 
twentieth century with the fust ill-fated attempt to intro-
duce national health insurance and have continued ever 
since. Interest groups have been key players in public bat-
tles over such fundamental questions. Yet they also have 
worked behind the scenes to shape the details of health care 
legislation and its implementation to serve the interests of 
their members. 
In exploring interest group activity in U.S. health 
policy since the 1960s, we concentrate here on three major 
efforts to expand health insurance coverage during this 
time period: the passage of Medicare and Medicaid, the 
fa ilure to enact the Clinton Health Security plan, and the 
enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA) . We do not, however, attempt to portray 
interest group activity on the range of health policy issues 
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that do not involve high-level officials and partisan 
maneuvering or to describe interest group influence on 
state health policies. 
EARLY OPPOSITION TO NATIONAL 
HEALTH CARE INSURANCE 
The major forces opposed to a larger government role in 
national health insurance were a constellation of health care 
providers led by the American Medical Association (AMA) 
and its allies in business and the insurance industry who 
joined forces with members of Congress to block social 
policy initiatives of (mostly) Democratic presidents. From 
the 1930s until 1964, an anti-reform coalition composed of 
the AMA, private insurers, and employers was able to thwart 
national health insurance initiatives by teaming up with a 
conservative coalition of southern Democrats and northern 
Republicans in Congress. The passage of Medicare and 
Medicaid in 1965 under President Lyndon B. Johnson 
( 1963-1969) was a rare defeat for this anti-reform coalition 
and reflected a new partisan reality in Congress fo llowing 
the watershed election of 1964. Yet both programs, by delib-
erate design, fell far short of un iversal coverage and targeted 
subgroups of the U.S. population. Whi le extending health 
insurance to seniors, the poor, and the disabled, Medicare 
and Medicaid made concessions to the med ical profession 
and private insurers in order to win their participation and 
support. 1 
The next major attempt at national health insurance 
occurred in 1993-1994 under President William J. Clinton 
( 1993-2001). His effort to wed market competition with 
government regulation and compulsory national insurance 
was met by fierce and successful resistance among key stake-
holders in the insurance industry and business community 
whose oppositional stance found common ground in a dis-
ciplined Republican Party and Democratic defectors in 
Congress. The executive branch's strategy of excluding 
health care stakeholders from meaningful negotiations on 
the terms of health care reform alienated opponents and 
contributed to the defeat of the in itiative.2 
President Barack Obama (2009- ), however, suc-
ceeded where President Clinton had failed. Unlike Clinton, 
Obama at the outset pursued a strategy of inclusion with 
major health care stakeholders, making concessions to 
former foes of reform and thereby neutralizing health care 
providers and insurers and employers who had blocked 
previous reform efforts. Determined Democrats in 
Congress held together and withstood unified Republican 
opposition to enact a law that greatly expanded health 
insurance coverage while still fa lling short of universal 
national health insurance. In following this strategy of 
inclusion, Obama accepted limits to the scope of reform: 
the PPACA preserved the premier role of private insurance 
and introduced only cautious provisions to alter the health 
care delivery system and the payment of providers. 
RESEARCH INSTITUTES AND INTEREST 
GROUPS IN AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY 
Research institutes (commonly known as th ink tanks) often 
serve as the wellspring of policy ideas, with interest groups 
acting as the vessels that carry such ideas along the stream 
of policymaking. The separation, however, is not always so 
neat; often, interest groups play a greater role than simply 
transmitting policy ideas. Indeed, groups seek to mold such 
ideas into legislative proposals that stand a chance of pas-
sage by Congress and approval by the president. To succeed 
in this endeavor, they must often forge alliances with each 
other and with partisan forces in Congress and the executive 
branch. Often, they will undertake public campaigns to 
influence public opinion in order to win policy battles. 
Research institutes offer policy ideas that interest 
groups or political parties take up and translate into legisla-
tive initiatives. Research institutes also undertake policy 
analysis of legislative proposals or existing programs, and 
their reports can influence the process and content oflegis-
lative proposals. Some think tanks are independent entities; 
others promote policies that toe a clear ideological line and 
are closely identified with particular interest groups or 
political parties. Research institutes are patient players in the 
policy fray: unlike elected politicians, who must face the 
timetable of frequent elections, research institutes can wait; 
the policy ideas they promote often suffer several legislative 
defeats over the course of decades before becoming law. 
Many major research institutes in the health policy 
arena are active in the political arena. Those that seek to 
analyze policy and disseminate information in a more dis-
passionate manner and using accepted social scientific 
research methods are the Kaiser Family Foundation and the 
Commonwealth Fund. Others produce respected analyses 
using scholarly and social scientific research methods, but 
have an identifiable leaning either for or against government 
intervention in health care. Among the former are the 
Brookings Institution, the Urban Institute, and the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation, while the American Enterprise 
Institute is among the latter. Increasingly, research institutes 
that adopt a clear ideological or partisan line have become 
active players in health policy debates. For example, the 
Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation have advocated 
free market ideas and disparaged what they see as "big gov-
ernment" in health care. The chief think tank promoting an 
active government role in heal th care is the Public Policy 
Research Institute. 
The relationships between research institutes and poli-
cymakers may be close. For example, the Heritage 
Foundation has been a champion of "premium support" as 
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a way to reform Medicare and control the costs of the pro-
gram. Premium support is a fixed-p remium contribution 
from the federal government that seniors would use to pur-
chase coverage from competing private insurers or from the 
traditional government Medicare plan. It is a controversial 
proposal, not least because it would transform Medicare 
from a defined benefit to defined contribution plan and 
would require seniors who chose a plan that was more 
expensive than the government's premium support to shoul-
der the additional cost. Although not the originator of pre-
mium support, the Heritage Foundation has promoted the 
idea in its publications and also has written favorably on 
Representative Paul Ryan's (R-WI; in office 1999-) versions 
of it in his budget proposals. The foundation also provided 
economic analysis of Ryan's budget proposals at his request.3 
Interest Groups 
Interest groups represent in the policy process those who 
share a common concern. They do not run candidates for 
political office themselves, but they may support particular 
candidates and parties. Interest groups transmit the demands 
of civil society to government policymakers. The theory of 
pluralism holds that interest groups compete with one another 
in an effort to influence policymakers, and the government is 
a neutral arbiter or referee among them. The policies enacted 
reflect the free play of ideas. In reality, however, some groups 
are more powerful than others. They may be better organized 
and have more money with which to fund their political 
activities than their rivals. Groups that represent the business 
interests tend to be more powerful in terms of money spent on 
political campaigns and lobbying than those representing 
labor unions, the environment, or consumers. 
Interest groups seek to influence policymakers through 
a number of ways. Chief among them is money to finance 
election campaigns. Political action committees (PACs) are 
the entities created by interest groups to channel campaign 
contributions to candidates whom they believe will be sym-
pathetic to their policy concerns. While larger interest 
groups had created their own PACs in the 1940s. these orga-
nizations became more prominent in the 1970s. In the wake 
of the Watergate scandal. Congress enacted reforms in the 
1970s designed to weaken the say of party leaders in select-
ing candidates at national party conventions and to set out 
rules for channeling campaign contributions to PACs. 
Perversely. these laws displaced party bosses only to make 
interest groups the chief players in candidate selection and 
election campaign finance. By 2009, 4,618 PACs were regis-
tered with the Federal Election Commission (FEC). the 
government agency that oversees them.4 
Money and Interest Groups 
Beginning with the presidential election of 2000, the influ-
ence of money in politics became more pronounced through 
the rise of soft money and issue advocacy groups, known by 
their Internal Revenue Service designations, 527s and 
50l(c)(4)s. Unlike PACs, which must abide by FEC rules 
limiting the amount of contributions and specifying strict 
reporting requirements, 527s and 50l(c)(4)s are largely 
unregulated and have become an avenue for interest groups 
to give unlimited amounts of money to election campaigns 
and issue advocacy efforts. Donors to such financing vehi-
cles do not face any limits to their contribution amounts. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission (2010) declared corporations 
to be persons possessing the right of free speech under the 
First Amendment, essentially freeing them from prior cam-
paign and issue advocacy contribution restrictions.5 
Interest groups also influence policymaking through 
lobbying members of Congress and the executive branch. 
Lobbyists meet with policymakers and seek to persuade 
them to adopt their group's position on a bill. Lobbyists 
provide key information to policymakers and may even help 
craft legislation or administrative rules. Groups may also 
mobilize their grassroots members to contact members of 
Congress or the president at critical moments in the legisla-
tive process. Finally, interest groups will also mount public 
campaigns and political advertising to try to shape public 
opinion and the position of policymakers. Lobbying activi-
ties are less subject to government regulation than campaign 
financing. Groups must report their lobbying expenditures 
to the federal government but, unlike contributions to PACs 
and election campaigns, face no limits on such spending.6 
Hyperpluralism 
The interest group landscape has become much more 
crowded since the late 1960s, so hyperpluralism is an apt 
description. Starting in the 1960s, the cozy world of a rela-
tively small number of interest groups representing the 
economic interests of business and labor in closed-door 
meetings with congression al committee leaders and the 
cabinet was transformed by an explosion of new groups 
promoting particular causes, such as civil rights. feminism, 
peace. and environmentalism. In 2011, there were 12,220 
registered lobbyists in the nation's capital.7 
Not only do policymakers confront a far greater num-
ber of interest groups, but these associations are also nar-
rower in scope than their economic predecessors.8 Such 
hyperpluralism makes it difficult for interest groups and 
their contacts in Congress or the executive branch to forge 
durable alliances on policy initiatives, particularly those 
proposing sweeping health care reforms. Indeed, several dif-
ferent associations represent the business community and 
are often at odds with each other on health policy reform. 
Interest group power in this environment is better described 
as negative power: groups are too numerous and frag-
mented to take positive action, but they can block a policy 
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initiative.9 Their ability to veto a policy initiative is made 
easier by the porousness of the U.S. political system, in 
which separation of powers and federalism offer numerous 
points of entry to organized interests. Numerous points in 
the legislative process give groups access to block a policy 
initiative, from the subcommittee and committee stages to 
floor votes in the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
to watering down a law by lobbying executive agencies or 
state governments at the rule-making and implementation 
stages, and finally, mounting lawsuits through the courts. 
The growth in the number of interest groups since the 
1960s not only reflects the activities of social movements 
and citizen groups but also is the product of government 
health policies. President Johnson's domestic policy initia-
tives of the Great Society aimed to eliminate poverty in the 
nation. The Great Society, which constituted the biggest 
expansion of the federal government in social policy since 
the New Deal of the 1930s, created two important govern-
ment health insurance programs, Medicare for senior citi-
zens and Medicaid for the poor and disabled. These 
programs, like others associated with the Great Society, 
created new stakeholders and interest groups with a direct 
interest in the implementation of these programs. 
Interest Groups and Their Allies 
Interest group power also depends on alliances forged among 
different organized stakeholders (that is, with other groups) 
as well as the partisan allies in Congress and the executive 
branch. Democrats and Republicans are more sympathetic to 
some groups than others. While the rules are not hard and 
fast, Democrats are more inclined to listen to groups promot-
ing organized labor, women, minorities, and patient advo-
cates, while Republicans tend to identify with business 
interests more generally and with providers and insurers in 
the health care arena. 
However, the power and influence of interest groups 
change over time. Seemingly impregnable alliances may 
unravel and new coalitions may take their place. Such 
alterations in interest group politics may occur for a num-
ber of reasons. New groups may enter the health policy 
arena to challenge existing coalitions. Coalitions may 
change in response to new challenges in the broader 
economy or within the health care system itself. In the face 
of such an altered environment, groups may redefine their 
interests, their policy preferences, and their partnerships. 
Changes in the partisan composition in Congress and the 
executive branch and in the ideological outlook in the 
Democratic and Republican parties themselves may pro-
vide organized interests and policymakers with opportuni-
ties to forge novel alliances around policy initiatives. All of 
these factors must be kept in mind when seeking to under-
stand the form of a policy initiative and its fa te in the poli -
cymaki ng process. 
Major Interest Groups in Health Policy 
The health policy umverse has greatly expanded since 
President Johnson's enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 
1965. The major groups are those representing health care 
providers, insurers, employers, unions, and patients. In the 
battle over Medicare, the major interests were the AMA, 
representing doctors; the American Hospital Association 
(AHA); the American Federation of Labor and the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CTO), the peak associa-
tion representing trade unions; and a handful of groups 
representing the business community and insurers.10 The 
AMA spent $1.2 million (or $10 million in 2010 dollars) in 
1965. 11 In 1993, when President Clinton attempted national 
health insurance, health care stakeholders numbered more 
than eleven hundred interest groups.12 The power of the 
AMA and AFL-CIO was greatly diminished, and they were 
two voices among many, including employers, consumers, 
insurers, and providers. Employers were represented by a 
number of competing associations, including the Business 
Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce, and the National 
Federation of Independent Business. Likewise, the insur-
ance industry was represented by two different groups: the 
American Association of Health Plans (AAHP), represent-
ing large managed care plans, and the Health Insurance 
Association of America (HIAA), whose members included 
smaller insurers. 
In 2009, when President Obama embarked on his 
health care reform effort, he encountered many of the same 
interest groups as well as those representing the pharmaceu-
tical industry (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers 
of America) and medical device manufactures, and new 
citizens' groups and political movements that coordinated 
the efforts of interest groups into broad pro- and anti-
reform coalitions. Among the latter were Organizing for 
America and MoveOn in support of health care reform and 
the Tea Party groups in opposition to it. Groups on both 
sides of the divide spent $3.3 billion in lobbying in 2009. 13 
The health care reform effort also led to the founding of new 
groups, such as the National Association of State Health 
Cooperatives. 
THE PASSAGE OF MEDICARE 
AND MEDICAID IN 1965 
In 1960, the health care system in the United States was 
largely a private affair. Voluntary employer-provided private 
insurance covered the majority of working-age Americans 
and their dependents. This state of affairs was the product of 
previous failures to enact universal national health insur-
ance. 14 Yet for those outside the labor force, insurance was 
hard to come by. Private insurers shunned the aged, poor, and 
disabled as unprofitable risks. Because these groups were 
outside the labor market, they were not covered by the system 
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of voluntary occupationally based insurance. It was precisely 
these categories of the "deserving" and "truly needy" who 
were deemed eligible for government intervention. 
A diverse reform coalition brought together actors 
with different but reconcilable interests. Health care reform-
ers in the Democratic Party viewed the provision of health 
insurance to senior citizens as a policy that could muster 
public support and expand their voting base among the 
elderly, while also appeasing interest groups that had 
opposed national health insurance initiatives in the past, 
such as commercial insurers and employers. The proposal 
also found favor with traditional Democratic allies such as 
organized labor, which wanted to shift responsibility for 
retiree health insurance from collective bargaining agree-
ments to the government. President Johnson pursued a 
strategy of co-optation to neutralize potential opponents in 
the health care community. 
The initial reform proposal was a contributory social 
insurance program modeled on Social Security pensions and 
financed from payroll taxes. Medicare would be a universal 
compulsory social insurance program for all seniors once 
they reached sixty- five years of age. As with Social Security, 
all seniors would be automatically enrolled in the program. 
The insurance would be a single-payer government program 
covering hospital care, which was far and away the most 
expensive portion of medical care at that time. The proposal 
carried a high degree of legitimacy and public support; after 
all, no one expected senior citizens to remain in the work-
force. It was also difficult to justify medical bankruptcy or 
forgoing necessary health care due to old age. 
The interest group universe in the battle over Medicare 
and Medicaid was sparsely populated by contemporary stan-
dards. The groups in favor of Medicare were peak associa-
tions representing organized labor, retirees, and those health 
care providers who provided care for seniors, such as the 
AFL-CIO, the American Association of Retired Workers, the 
American Geriatrics Society, and the National Coalition of 
Senior Citizens (itself a creation of the AFL-CIO). Except for 
the AFL-CIO, most of these groups lacked political muscle. 
This pro-reform coalition faced a much more powerful alli-
ance of health care providers, insurers, and employers. These 
consisted of the American Medical Association, the American 
Hospital Association, the National Association of Blue Shield 
Plans (the health insurance for doctors' services run by stale 
branches of the AlVIA), the Life Insurance Association of 
America, the National Association of Manufacturers, the 
Chamber of Commerce, the American Farm Bureau 
Federation (the mainstream group representing farmers in 
the political arena), and the American Legion. 15 
Interest Groups Gain Concessions 
Given the forces arrayed against Medicare and Medicaid, 
how did these programs ever get enacted into law? The 
answer lies in a combination of factors. The new partisan 
political terrain in Washington following the 1964 election 
set the stage for enactment of the Great Society programs, 
the biggest expansion of the welfare state si nee the New Deal 
of the 1930s. In addition, President Johnson and congres-
sional leaders forged a bipartisan agreement on a compro-
mise proposal that created the new social insurance 
programs of Medicare and Medicaid but fell fa r short of 
national health insurance, which served to mute potential 
opposition to reform. 16 
The first fac tor was the emergence of a new interest 
group alliance supporting government health insurance for 
senior citizens and the poor. The new coalition drove a 
wedge between stakeholders that had long opposed national 
health insurance while bringing together groups that were 
normally at odds with each other: the AFL-CIO represent-
ing organized labor and the HIAA representing commercial 
insurers, and the nonprofit, provider-run Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield plans. The AFL-CIO supported social insurance for 
seniors because it would relieve it of the task of negotiating 
retiree health benefits, which ate into the benefits of current 
workers. Removing retirees from collective bargaining 
would allow unions to focus their efforts on winning higher 
wages and fringe benefits for current workers. Insurance 
companies were predisposed to government insurance for 
seniors because this demographic tended to have higher 
medical costs and was therefore not profitable to insure. 
Besides, most seniors could not afford to purchase individ-
ual health plans because of the practice of experience rating, 
whereby insurers set premiums to a person's medical condi-
tion. A govenu11ent program for all seniors would allow 
commercial and nonprofit insurers to focus on working-age 
adults and their famil ies who were profitable. Like they did 
with the elderly, commercial insurers also shunned the poor 
and disabled because of their unprofitability. Moreover, 
these groups were long considered the responsibility of state 
and local government welfare programs. 
Concessions Concerning Medicare and Medicaid 
The AMA, however, vociferously opposed Medicare and 
Medicaid and resorted to the same argument of "socialized 
medicine" that it had used so effectively to defeat national 
health insmance efforts in earlier decades. Yet this time, it 
could not count on the insurance industry as an ally. Thus 
isolated, the AMA lacked the muscle to halt the enactment 
of Medicare and Medicaid. 
Even so, doctors, along with hospitals and insurers, 
won significant concessions in the fin al bill that secured 
their place in the new programs. Policymakers did so in a 
preemptive fashion; they wanted to be sure that doctors and 
hospitals would participate in the new public insurance 
programs, so they sweetened them to buy off the support of 
powerful health care stakeholders. Hence, providers in 
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Medicare and Medicaid would re<;:eive fee-for-service reim-
bursement. Of course, this form or reimbursement is inher-
ently inflationary, because it encourages volume and 
expensive high-tech procedures, allowing providers to bill 
for each item of service and rewarding high-tech proce-
dures. Hospitals won an additional concession of "cost plus 
2 percent;' which allowed them to bill an additional 2 per-
cent on their fee-for-service itemizations. Not only did the 
AMA preserve fee-for-service, but doctors also evaded 
anything approaching nationally set prices. Instead, they 
would be reimbursed the "usual, customary, and reasonable" 
rates prevai ling in their locality. Insurers also did quite well 
under Medicare and Medicaid. Responsibility for claims 
processing and provider reimbursement of these public 
insurance programs fell not to a government agency but 
instead to commercial and nonprofit insurers such as Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield. 
The new political environment was the second factor 
that set the stage for the enactment of Medicare and 
Medicaid. The assassination of President John F. Kennedy 
(1961-1963) in November 1963 was a traumatic event for the 
country and directly and forcefully contributed to the out-
come of the momentous 1964 presidential and congressional 
elections. Along with the election of Lyndon B. Johnson as 
president, Democrats swept both houses of Congress, secur-
ing majorities of sixty-eight seats in the Senate and 295 seats 
in the House of Representatives. The biggest change was the 
entry of liberal-minded Democrats from the urban north 
and the concomitant fading of the power of conservative 
southern Democrats in Congress who had stymied social 
reform by Democratic presidents since the 1930s and 1940s. 
President Johnson secured an electoral mandate and the 
congressional votes to enact his antipoverty programs. 
This new political terrain fed directly into the biparti-
san deal on Medicare and Medicaid. The Democratic chair-
man of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur 
Mills (D-AR; in office 1939-1977), created a bill that com-
bined three different reform approaches to forge an agree-
ment between Democrats and Republicans in Congress. The 
"three-layer cake" proposal drew together an AFL-CIO 
proposal for hospital insurance, an AMA proposal for 
optional insurance to cover physician services, and the 
existing Kerr-Mills program enacted in 1960, which pro-
vided limited federal grants to states to care for their impov-
erished elderly. This three-layer cake became Medicare Part 
A, mandatory insurance for seniors to cover hospital and 
limited skilled nursing care expenses; Medicare Part B, 
optional insurance to cover physician services; and 
Medicaid, the joint federal-state insurance program cover-
ing the disabled and defined categories of the poor. 17 
Medicare and Medicaid represented a complex com-
promise that deliberately addressed the concerns of an array 
of stakeholders. President Johnson enhanced the chances of 
passage of these programs by pursuing a strategy of inclu-
sion and co-optation of powerful potential opponent~. Thus, 
Medicare Part A addressed concerns of the AFL-CIO and 
other groups representing the elderly who wanted hospital 
insurance for seniors. Part B's concessions to the AMA and 
private insurers muted their opposition. Medicaid brought 
needed federal assistance to state and local governments for 
the case of the poor and disabled. The bipartisan nature of 
the deal allowed both parties to claim credit for legislation 
that had broad public support. 
Medicare and Medicaid constituted a mixed legacy in 
the history of social policy in the United States. The creation 
of new government insurance programs for the most vul-
nerable groups of the population was the biggest single 
expansion of the welfare state since the New Deal. Yet 
Medicare and Medicaid did not represent the stepping stone 
to imminent national health insurance as supporters of 
Medicare Part A had envisioned. Instead, grafting separate 
government insurance programs for seniors, the poor, and 
the disabled onto the system of voluntary employment-
based insurance for able-bodied working-age Americans 
only served to dampen calls for comprehensive national 
health insurance in the United States for the time being.18 
Subsequent Republican and Democratic administrations 
considered national health insurance proposals, but these 
went nowhere. The next major push for national health 
insurance would come in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
with interest groups far more splintered and seemingly inca-
pable of forging a coalition for positive politics action. 
HYPER PLURALISM AND THE DEATH 
OF HEALTH SECURITY IN 1994 
The 1980s saw skyrocketing health care costs, which trans-
lated into a 90 percent hike in premiums for employment-
based insurance between 1987 and 1993. 19 U.S. employers 
came to view this trend as an unsustainable assault on their 
profitability and survival. In the brave new world of global-
ization, manufacturing giants like General Motors faced 
stiffer competition from overseas competitors enjoying the 
advantage of much lower labor costs. Even on their home 
turf, firms offering health insurance had to shoulder higher 
labor costs, which put them at a competitive disadvantage to 
rivals who did not. In 1989 Chrysler took the unheard-of 
step of publicly calling on the government to enact national 
health insurance.20 If all firms were forced to offer insurance 
to their workforce, it would level the competitive playing 
field. This new reality, in turn, drove a wedge in the coalition 
that had long opposed national health insurance, as employ-
ers began to resent the profits of health care providers and 
insurers at their expense. However, the hyperpluralistic 
interest group universe in U.S. politics made it difficult to 
assemble a successful coalition able to support a national 
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health insurance plan. Instead, interest groups proved them-
selves far better at blocking reform rather than fostering or 
sustaining it. 
President Clinton and Health Security 
Yet the chances for the passage of national health insurance 
were encouraging at the start of Democrat Bill Clinton's 
presidency in 1993. Clinton had made health care reform, 
along with economic issues, a centerpiece of his presidential 
campaign, and for good reason. In 1991, Harris Wofford 
scored an upset victory in a special election for a Senate seat 
in Pennsylvania by running on a platform promising to 
enact universal health insurance. More Americans were los-
ing health insurance as they lost their jobs in the recession 
or as their employers, facing unacceptable premium hikes, 
dropped coverage. Opinion polls showed that Americans 
were deeply worried about losing their workplace health 
insurance, with majorities agreeing that the health care sys-
tem needed to be "totally rebuilt" and in favor of the federal 
government guaranteeing universal coverage.21 
Clinton believed that national health insurance, based 
in the familiar setting of employment and provided by pri-
vate insurers, would inoculate himself and his party against 
charges of socialized medicine and would appeal not only to 
the w1insured, but also to the middle class facing economic 
insecurity in the recession and to the business community 
complaining about rising costs. Representing the "New 
Democrat" wing of his party, Clinton sought to jettison the 
party's tax-and-spend, big-government image that had cost 
it the support of the middle and working classes that had 
defected to President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) . The New 
Democrat wing championed public-private initiatives and 
market solutions to public policy problems, in contrast to 
some of their older colleagues who had been active in the 
New Deal and Great Society battles. New Democrats also 
reckoned that their strategy would help forge a new electoral 
coalition among the middle class, the working class, and the 
poor and would overcome traditional wedge issues, such as 
social welfare, which divided voters on race and class linesY 
This calculus was plausible, because Clinton enjoyed 
Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, even 
though he was elected president on a plurality of 43 percent 
of the popular vote.23 
Content of Health Security 
Clinton's national health insurance plan, which he dubbed 
Health Security, reflected this effort to span this wide elec-
toral and interest group divide. It would build on existing 
employment-based private insurance but would achieve 
universal coverage by mandating all employers to offer cov-
erage to their workforce. Insurance would be financed pri-
marily by payroll taxes but also excise taxes. Small businesses 
would receive federal tax credits to make such coverage 
affordable. Medicare and Medicaid would have survived as 
separate entities but would have been subjected to cuts in 
their budgets. 
The Clinton plan contained several innovations 
intended to realize the twin goals of universal access and 
cost containment in health care. Foremost among these was 
managed competition, which involved government regula-
tion of the insurance market to ensure universal access to 
care and competition and choice among health plans to 
encourage cost containment. The idea for managed compe-
tition came from Stanford health economist Alain Enthoven, 
who fi rst proposed such a scheme in 1980 and refined it in 
subsequent journal articles.2'1 Managed competition under 
Health Security would require all employers to offer their 
workers at least three plans that would differ in terms of 
cost-sharing, premiums, and choice of providers. The 
reformers expected that employees would choose the lower 
cost plans, thus bringing down health care costs. At the 
same time, managed competition set new restrictions on 
insurers to bar them from competing by cream-skimming. 
Instead of enrolling healthy people and excluding the sick 
from coverage through coverage denials and preexisting 
conditions exclusions, insurers would now be required to 
offer a comprehensive basic benefits package to all appli-
cants, charge community-rated premiums that would effec-
tively spread health risks by levying the same rate for all in a 
region rather than differentiating by a person's medical 
condition, and have plans with healthier members make 
risk-adjusted payments to plans with sicker members. 
Further, insurers would not be able to deny coverage to 
enrolled members when they became sick by means of 
invoking preexisting condition exclusions. Responsibility 
for administration of the health care system would be split 
between the federal and state governments. State govern-
ments would create and administer the individual and 
small-group insurance markets (or delegate this job to a 
nonprofit entity). Employers with at least five thousand 
employees could opt out of the state exchanges and instead 
assume their own financial risk for insuring their members, 
which many already did as self-insured plans. At the 
national level, Congress would set and update the basic ben-
efits package. Finally, a National Insurance Board with 
members appointed by the president would have the author-
ity to regulate alliances and health plans, and even to limit 
premium increases to the rate of inflation in the event that 
competition failed to deliver health care cost containment. 
Clinton publicly launched his health care reform plan 
in a speech to Congress and the American people on 
September 22, 1993. Opinion polls shortly following the 
speech showed that most Americans were supportive of 
Health Secmity. Yet hopes for passage of Health Security 
were dashed in the ensuing year. The president's proposal 
never made it to a floor vote in Congress even though the 
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Democratic Party enjoyed majorities in both the House and 
Senate. By August 1994, health care reform was dead. In the 
congressional midterm elections, the Democrats lost control 
of both houses of Congress to the Republicans, a polit ical 
event not seen since 1952. 
Shutting Out Stakeholders 
This spectacular turn of events was owed to the mobilization 
of an anti-reform coalition led chiefly by health insurers and 
employers allied with congressional Republicans. The strat-
egy that President Clinton chose to undertake health care 
reform had to bear much of the blame for this outcome. It 
was as though he and his advisers had ignored the realities 
of U.S. politics, especially separation of powers, party indis-
cipline, and the extreme pluralism of the interest group 
universe. The president created a special task force in early 
1993 to d raw up health care reform, but the way he d id so 
alienated potential allies. Clinton appointed his spouse, 
Hillary Rodham Clinton, and his close friend and political 
adviser Ira Magaziner to head the task force. Though Hillary 
Clinton possessed ample expertise and knowledge in health 
policy, neither she nor Magaziner were cabinet members 
subject to Senate confirmation. As a result, they lacked 
legitimacy that such a confirmation process might have pro-
vided. Far worse was that the task force and its affiliated 
committees of experts worked behind closed doors and shut 
out Democratic members of Congress with years of experi-
ence in health policy. Feeling snubbed by the president, 
Democratic and Republican members of Congress produced 
their own competing versions of health care reform so that 
as many as seven bills were being considered by Congress in 
1994. The task force was equally insensitive to the need to 
win over important health care stakeholders, such as asso-
ciations representing employers and insurers. While for-
mally consulted in task force hearings, they were not official 
members of the task force and therefore were denied the 
opportunity to take part in real negotiations and the resu l-
tant give-and-take that would have accompanied such a 
process. With the growing opposition to Health Security, the 
Clinton administration also made matters worse by embark-
ing on a public campaign to demonize the insurance indus-
try, which only fur ther riled up the opposition. In short, the 
exclusionary strategy the Clintons adopted proved to be a 
recipe for disaster. Notably, it was the polar opposite of 
President Johnson's strategy of co-optation of key interest 
groups and congressional leaders that culminated in the suc-
cessful enactment of Medicare and Medicaid. 
Interest Groups and Health Security 
The interest group universe in 1994 was very different from 
1965. It was a much more crowded field, with more than 
eleven hundred groups with a stake in the outcome of health 
care reform.25 The sheer 1mmber of groups made it d ifficult 
to build a broad coalition in favor of health care reform. Nor 
were there a few peak associations that could speak authori-
tatively for their sector. Interest groups were far better at 
exerting negative power to block policy than to take positive 
action to enact it.26 
Nowhere was th is more apparent than with the busi-
ness community, which lacked an overarching peak asso-
ciation to speak au thoritatively on its behalf. Instead, 
businesses had several d ifferent organizations representing 
them, and they were badly divided on health care reform. 
The Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce initially supported national health insurance 
but backed off in the face of revolts from their member-
ship. The Chamber of Commerce also had to stanch the 
hemorrhaging of members who were defecting to the 
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), a 
rival association that was vocal in its opposition to the 
employer mandate.27 Business associations thus proved far 
more adept at representing the interests of their own firm 
or sector, exert ing negative power to block legislation they 
did not like.28 
This disarray among large firms and other potential 
allies of Health Security left the fie ld open to groups firmly 
set against reform and far better able to mobilize their grass-
roots members. The two most effective foes to enter the fray 
were the NFIB and the HIAA, which mobilized their base 
among smaller insurers who feared for their survival in the 
world of managed care, and they ran a highly effective series 
of television ads targeted to sway members of Congress in 
key districts. In contrast, the forces favoring national health 
insurance expressed at best lukewarm support for Health 
Security. Groups such as AARP and organized labor proved 
no match for the opponents in getting their members 
involved. Also notable was the phenomenon of"reverse lob-
bying" by Republican congressional leaders who pressured 
business associations such as the Chamber of Commerce to 
take a neutral stance on health care reform or else risk the 
loss of congressional action on other legislation that busi-
ness held dear.29 The AMA, however, was striking in its lack 
of influence over the reform debate. Like other interest 
groups, the president's task force had shu t it out of negotia-
tions on Health Security. Moreover, with the loss of mem-
bers and the growth of rival physician organizations in the 
years since the passage of Medicare and Medicaid, the 
association could no longer plausibly claim to be the exclu-
sive voice of the medical profession. Instead, the AMA was 
just another interest group in the battle over health care 
reform.30 
Finally, Health Security contained some key ele-
ments that proved to be difficult to sell to the American 
public. Chief among these were the health alliances. 
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Although the president insisted that they 
were not government entities, the non-
partisan Congressional Budget Office 
thought otherwise and figured them into 
its cost estimates for Health Security. 
Congressional Republicans, meanwhile, 
seized on the complexity of Health 
Security and the unfamiliarity of many 
of its provisions, especially health main-
tenance organizations (HMOs), and won 
the battle for public opinion by portray-
ing the legislation as a government levia-
than that would stifle patients' choice of 
doctor and kill off small businesses. With 
Health Securi ty's allies sitting on the 
sidelines and belatedly launching an ane-
mic counteroffensive, the field was left to 
health care stakeholders and Republicans 
who waged a spectacular campaign of 
opposition through an on slaught of lob-
AARP (formerly the American Association of Retired Persons) calls for citizens age 
fifty and older to make their views known about Medicare and Social Security. With 
more than thirty-seven million members, AARP is usually a powerful and outspoken 
lobbying group on issues of concern to older Americans. 
bying and political ads. Opinion polls SOURCE: Mario Tama/Geuy Images. 
reflected the effectiveness of this cam-
paign: while 59 percent of poll respondents had expressed 
support for Health Security right after Clinton's September 
1993 speech, that dropped to 46 percent by February 1994 
and never recovered, hovering between 42 and 44 percent 
by summer 1994.31 
Employers and Health Care 
Cost-Cutting Strategies 
Following the government immobility on h ealth care 
reform, employers followed a go-it-alone strategy to con-
trol their own health care outlays. In essence, they used 
competitive forces and managed care but with none of the 
rules to safeguard the sick that Health Security would have 
provided. Instead, employers herded their workers into 
managed care plans that controlled costs by means of pre-
authorizing (often denying) expensive high-tech proce-
dures and referrals to specialists, putting physicians at 
financial risk for the health of their patients via capitated 
payments. Some of the goals and practices of managed care 
were laudatory, such as coordinating care th rough primary 
care doctors and moving away from the perverse more-is-
better incentives of fee-for-service reimbursement. Other 
practices, however, were less benign and even harmful to 
patient care. These included financial bonuses to physician 
reviewers who met a targeted level of treatment denials, 
paying bonuses to groups of doctors for staying within a 
preset financial target, and basing medical treatment deni -
als on the absence of agreed-upon clinical practice guide-
lines based in scientific research. Whereas fee-for-service 
reimbursement had encouraged physicians to perform 
more procedures and more expensive ones, the managed 
care revolution contained equally perverse incentives but 
in the opposite direction, tempting insurers and providers 
to reduce access to care even if it was medically necessary. 
In the absence of good information on clinical effective-
ness and of a legal framework to prohibit insurers from 
engaging in such practices or mandating coverage to all 
patients, competition became a sledgehammer to pulverize 
the weakest market players, especially small firms and 
sicker patients. At the same time, the utilization review 
processes adopted by insurers spawned a gargantuan pri-
vate sector bureaucracy of medical reviewers and claims 
processors. 
Managed care without adequate regulation allowed 
insurers and employers to trim health care costs for a few 
years in the mid-1990s, but at the expense of inciti ng a back-
lash. Managed care horror stories abounded.32 Facing rising 
employee dissatisfac tion with their health insurance, 
employers retreated and offered them health plans with 
more choices and less management of patients' treatments. 
With this accommodation, however, the upward trend in 
health insurance premiums resumed. Between 1999 and 
2011, premiums for employer-based heal th insurance more 
than doubled. Coverage of an individual employee rose 
from $2,196 to $5,791 in those years, while premiums for 
family coverage jumped from $5,429 to $15,073.33 Firms 
responded by shifting the rising cost of health insurance 
onto their employees by means of passing on the premium 
hikes. In addition, high-deductible health plans became 
more common, especially among smaller firms, as did 
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The Fight against Health Security 
The battle over President William J. Clinton's Health Security proposal dramatically illustrated the negative influence of interest groups in the policy process. Along with 
more traditional techniques of lobbying legislators and mobilizing grassroots members, the episode also witnessed the deployment of novel lobbying techniques, such 
as politicians reversing the usual direction of influence and leaning heavily on interest groups for their particular stances on health care reform. 
The myriad Interest groups representing health care stakeholders also made the forging of a unified coalition in favor of reform extremely challenging. Groups 
representing a specific interest or sector often were at odds with one another. Nowhere was this more apparent than with employers, who lacked a single peak association 
to speak on their behalf or to coordinate their political strategies. Associations such as the Business Roundtable, which represented large corporations, tended to be sup-
portive of Health Security. However, the small business association, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), was virulently opposed to the Clinton plan 
and, in particular, its employer mandate. The Chamber of Commerce found itself in the crossfire. The association had endorsed universal coverage and some form of 
employer mandate to finance it. Yet it took flak for its stance from its own base, which in turn had been goaded to action by congressional Republicans. The Chamber of 
Commerce also saw defections to its rival, the NFI B. In the face of these pressures, the Chamber reversed its position and officially abandoned its support for universal 
coverage and an employer mandate. 
Insurers were also badly split on health care reform. Larger commercial insurers, which already had HMO plans, anticipated the influx of millions of new customers 
under the Clinton plan. Small insurers viewed managed competition with trepidation, believing they might not survive. The Health Insurance Association of America 
(HIAA) was the trade group reprmnting large and small insurers. Its internal divisions prompted larger insurers to exit the HIAA and form its own organization to lobby 
in favor of Health Security. The HIAA took up the cause of small insurers and launched a series of television ads deriding Health Security. The ads featured a fictional 
middle-class, middle-aged couple, Harry and Louise, poring over Health Security and opining that the Clinton plan would amount to government intrusion into the 
patient-doctor relationship, with the government making choices about one's personal health care. The ads were very effective in tapping into Americans' vague but 
deep-seated fears of big government. Moreover, the HIAA targeted the ads to run in key congressional districts in order to have maximum impact on the most vulnerable 
legislators. 
The once-powerful American Medical Association (AMA) was just another interest group in this crowded health policy field. For one thing, it no longer had 
the majority of doctors as members and had to contend with rival medical associations. This reality undermined its claim as the sole and legitimate voice of the 
medical profession. In addition, the coalition of doctors, insurers, and employers that had led successful charges against national health insurance in previous 
decades by now had splintered, with cost-conscious employers challenging insurers and providers, and insurers, in turn, questioning doctors' unlimited professional 
freedom in treatment and income decisions. The AMA itself was deeply divided over health care reform and sent a mixed message publicly supporting some aspects 
of the Clinton plan (such as universal coverage) while stopping short of endorsing it outright. Many members feared the reforms would limit their incomes and 
clinical freedom. Coming under heavy fi re from the NFIB and congressional Republicans, the AMA eventually backtracked on its timid support of health care 
reform.14 
The overall effect of this tidal surge of interest groups arrayed against Health Security was telling: erstwhile allies turned into opponents of reform or just retreated 
to the sidelines. Public support for the Clinton plan tumbled. Congress, in turn, decided to take a pass and let the various reform proposals die in committee. Interest 
groups may not have been solely responsible for the death of health care reform, but they certainly were "accessories to the crime:· 
SOURCES: Susan Giaimo, Markets and Medicine: The Politics of Health Care Reform in Brirain, Germany, and rhe Unired Scares (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2002), 168-1 76; Cat hi Jo Martin, Stuck in Neurral: Business and the Politics of Human Capiral/nvestmenr Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), ch. 6; 
Theda Skocpoi, Boomerang: Clinton's Healrh Security Effort and the Turn against Government in U.S. Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996). 
health plans with substantial coinsurance and copayments 
provisions that were shouldered by employees as out-of-
pocket expenses. According to Milliman, the total cost of 
health insurance for a typical family of four, which included 
not only premium hikes but also the cost-sharing arrange-
ments just described, jumped from $9,235 in 2002 to 
$19,393 in 2011.35 
Nor did managed care or an expanding economy in 
the 1990s do much to stanch the rising tide of uninsured, 
which stood at 40.6 million, or 15.4 percent of the non-
elderly population, in 1995 to 47 million, or 17 percent, in 
2007, the year before the onset of the Great Recession.36 
BRINGING STAKEHOLDERS 
BACK IN: THE PATIENT PROTECTION 
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 
The Great Recession that hit in 2008 ushered in an era of 
economic insecurity not seen in the United States since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. The root cause lay in the 
reckless lending and trading practices of investment banks 
in the real estate market. When the housing bubble burst, it 
brought the restof the economy to the brink Unemployment, 
which had stood at only 4.4 percent in 2007, rose quickly to 
peak at 10 percent in October 2009.37 To avert a complete 
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breakdown of the international fmancial system and a major 
economic depression, national governments in the United 
States and Europe had to intervene with massive taxpayer 
bailouts of the banks. In the United States, government bail-
outs also extended to the car industry, which faced steeply 
falling demand and the near bankruptcy of General Motors 
and Chrysler. Such government intervention in the econ-
omy had not been seen since the Great Depression and 
World War II (1939-1945). 
Naturally, the turbulent economy had major repercus-
sions in health care, because most working-age Americans 
and their dependents received health insurance from their 
workplace. Mass unemployment drove up the numbers of 
uninsured. Each 1 percent increase in unemployment trans-
lated into one million Americans losing their health insur-
ance coverage. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that 49.2 
million people, or nearly 20 percent of Americans under age 
sixty-five, were uninsured at the peak of the recession in 
2009.38 Yet government programs like Medicaid and the 
Children's Health Insurance Program for the poor and near-
poor were unable to cover all of these uninsured people.39 
The state and federal governments fund these programs 
jointly, but the states were facing huge budget gaps owing to 
the recession-induced fall in tax revenues plus greater 
demand for such health care programs and unemployment 
benefits. Furthermore, state governments d id not have 
much maneuvering room; unlike the federal government, 
nearly all state constitutions require their governments to 
balance their budgets annually. This foreclosed the option of 
deficit spending. Other than in states such as California, 
most governors did not want to raise ta-xes to pay for addi-
tional state outlays. Lastly, the Medicaid and Children's 
Health Insurance Program coverage rules excluded certain 
people by design: they covered poor families with children 
but left out low-income childless adults. The health care 
safety net was stretched so tightly that it was fraying in many 
places. 
Barack Obama and Health Care Reform 
The political terrain had also shifted, with Democrats recap-
turing the White House after eight years of Republican rule. 
Democratic President Barack Obama soundly beat his 
Republican rival Senator John McCain in the November 
2008 election, and Democrats also secured comfortable 
majorities in both houses of Congress. Obama had placed 
health care reform at the front and center of his campaign, 
and the election results indicated that he had a mandate for 
action. Even so, the economic crisis at first glance seemed an 
inauspicious environment in which to undertake any major 
health care reform. Paradoxically, however, the desperate 
economy provided an opening for a health care overhaul. 
The federal government had already intervened in the 
economy with its bailout of the banks and the car industry. 
lf the banks, which were responsible for the mess, could 
receive billions of dollars of government aid, should not the 
millions of ordinary Americans experiencing unemploy-
ment and loss of their health insurance obtain a helping 
hand from the government? With this argument, Obama 
and his advisers turned vice into virtue and transformed the 
econom ic crisis into a window of opportunity to move for-
ward the plan for health care for all. 
What sort of health care reform would Obama and the 
Democrats enact? How would it expand access to the grow-
ing millions of uninsured? Also, how could it avert potential 
opposition from key health care interest groups who had 
wrecked past efforts at reform? The left wing of the 
Democratic Party and labor union allies wanted a single-
payer tax-fmanced government insurance plan, or "Medicare 
for all;' along the lines of Canada's plan, but the fiscally 
conservative "Blue Dog" wing of the party could not coun -
tenance such an expansion of government outlays. Others 
seeking a third way between these two wings proposed a 
government health plan to compete alongside private 
employment-based insurance. This "public option;' or 
"Medicare for some;' would have stopped well short of a 
universal government plan and accordingly would have put 
less strain on the federal budget. Yet like the Medicare pro-
gram, it would have enjoyed the economics of scale and the 
market power to negotiate lower reimbursement rates with 
providers and hopefully would force private insurers to do 
the same in order to stay competitive.'10 The public option 
naturally offended insurers, who foresaw smaller profits as a 
resu lt, as well as providers like the AMA and AHA, who 
feared lower reimbursements. Liberal Democrats hoped 
that the public option would be the first step toward a sin-
gle-payer insurance plan for all Americans, while conserva-
tives feared the same fate. In the end, the plan did not have 
enough votes to pass the Senate, and President Obama 
declared his willingness to jettison the proposal in order to 
ensure passage of health care reform in that chamber. 
The Need for Compromise 
The compromise solution that Democrats finally agreed on 
retained employment-based private insurance for most 
Americans (since they already had it) while making it more 
affordable to them via income-based tax credits. In addition, 
Medicaid would be expanded to cover all individuals, even 
adults without children, but with incomes at or below 138 
percent of the federal poverty limit. An online marketplace, 
or exchange, for heal th insurance for individuals and small 
businesses would operate in each state. The exchanges 
would put into practice the theory of managed competition: 
insurers in the exchanges would compete on price of pre-
mium and associated cost-sharing, but not on health risks. 
A transparent easy-to-compare format, much like the site 
Travelocity for airfares, would make it easy for consumers to 
1 
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shop for the plan that fit their needs. All insurers, whether 
inside or outside the exchanges, would no longer be able to 
exclude the sick from coverage through preexisting condi-
tions clauses or experience-rated premiums. Instead, they 
would have to accept aU applicants, would not be able to 
drop coverage based on health status, and would have to 
charge community-rated premiums that would vary only by 
sex, family size, region, and whether a person smoked. In 
addition, insurers in the exchanges that had a dispropor-
tionate share of sicker members would receive risk-adjusted 
payments from those that did not. 
Many of the features of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, then, looked very similar to President 
Clinton's Health Security plan of nearly two decades earlier. 
Instead of alliances there were now exchanges, competition 
coupled with consumer safeguards would control costs, and 
employment-based insurance would remain the norm for 
most Americans. There were also important differences. 
Unlike the Clinton plan, the PPACA went beyond reform of 
the insurance market to address, albeit tentatively, the infla-
tionary features inherent in the organization and delivery of 
health care. Thus, the government encouraged but did not 
mandate experiments with bundled payments to providers 
(flat-rate payments per case or per episode of care) paired 
with financial rewards for improved patient health out-
comes, encouraged new forms of medical practice such as 
accountable care organizations and patient-centered medical 
homes to coordinate the care of patients with chronic dis-
eases, and provided funding for providers to adopt electronic 
medical records to make such coordinated care and mea-
surement of health outcomes a reality. 
The major departure from the Clinton plan concerned 
the question of financing health insmance. Instead of man-
dating all employers to offer insurance as the Clinton plan 
had proposed, the PPACA imposed the insmance mandate 
on individuals. However, it would come with tax credits up 
to 400 percent of the federal poverty limit so that insurance 
would be affordable for those in the lower and middle 
classes. The PPACA stopped short of an employer mandate, 
but it gave firms incentives to do so under a "play-or-pay" 
scheme: employers who refused to provide insurance would 
pay a financial penalty for each of their full -ti me workers. 
This fine would be used to pay for their employees seeking 
insurance in the individual market. However, small busi-
nesses would be exempt from play-or-pay. 
Interestingly, the idea of an individual mandate had 
long been proposed by political conservatives. They had 
proposed the individual mandate as a way to decouple 
health insurance from employment. The individual man-
date would place responsibility for health insurance on 
individuals but would also give them the freedom to shop 
around for a health plan that met their needs rather than 
have thei r employer choose one for them. In the 2008 
presidential election campaign, the individual mandate was 
the centerpiece of John McCain's health care reform pro-
posal. Candidate Obama himself was initially skeptical of 
the need for such a mandate and believed that subsidies for 
lower income people would be sufficient to convince them 
to sign up for insurance voluntarily. However, his advisers 
subsequently convinced him that the mandate was critical 
to the survival of insurance markets because it would allow 
for the pooling of the healthier with the sicker. 
The PPACA not only based itself on the theoretical 
model of managed care laid out in the Clinton health plan, 
but it also drew on the real-world example of the Massachusetts 
Health Plan. Enacted by a Democratic-controlled legislature 
and Republican governor Mitt Romney (in office 2003-
2007), who signed it into law in 2006,41 the Massachusetts 
Health Plan introduced near-universal coverage of state resi-
dents through private employment-based insurers. It out-
lawed insurers' practices that discriminated against the sick. 
It created an online exchange where small businesses and 
individuals in the state could shop around for coverage from 
competing private insurers. Finally, an individual mandate 
and the play-or-pay provisions for employers were also fea-
tures, as were tax credits for those on low incomes to make 
insurance affordable. 
Cutting Deals with Health Care Stakeholders 
If the PPACA borrowed much from the ill-fated Clinton 
plan, why did Congress enact it? Also, why did health care 
stakeholders not set out to destroy it as they had Health 
Security nearly two decades earlier? The answer Lies in the 
very different strategy that President Obama and congres-
sional Democrats pursued, which was quite the opposite of 
the one that the Clintons had followed. Obama and 
Democratic leaders in Congress took into account the dan-
gers presented by powerful health care interest groups and 
the fragmented political system's capacity to destroy party 
unity and to provide numerous veto points to organized 
interests, and they plotted their strategy accordingly. That 
strategy entailed maintaining intraparty unity and bringing 
key interest groups early on into real negotiations in order to 
gain their support of reform. Obama showed a willingness 
to make strategic concessions with both congressional 
Democrats and health care interest groups in order to keep 
reform on track. At the same time, allies of the PPACA were 
far more effective in mobilizing grassroots support and 
maintaining uni ty than in 1994. 
Democratic leaders decided to unify the different 
committee bills into a s ingle piece of legislation for consid-
eration in each chamber. Such action focused Democratic 
minds on one bill rather than on several competing versions 
of reform that had exerted such a centrifugal effect on party 
unity during 1993 and 1994. In a further departure from the 
Clinton strategy, Obama also decided to give Congress the 
--
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lead in drafting health care reform legislation. This defer-
ence d id much to forge a partisan bond able to traverse the 
institutional chasm created by separation of powers. 
The most important concession that Obama made to 
ensure party unity was to drop the public option from the 
final version of health care reform. This was done as the 
politics of necessity, in large part to ensure Democratic 
Party unity across the different branches of government. 
House Democrats, who enjoyed a comfortable majority and 
whose Speaker was among the liberal wing of the party, had 
the votes (just barely, as it turned out) to include a watered-
down version of the public option in their reform bill. The 
situation in the Senate was quite different. In that chamber, 
the moderate wing of the Democratic Party was stronger 
and the party's majority of seats was less assured under the 
filibuster, which allowed a minority of forty-one senators to 
block a floor vote on a bill. Were the public option included 
in the Senate reform bill, the defection of even a few moder-
ate Democratic senators would have been enough to kill the 
legislation in a Republican-led filibuster. Aware of the num-
bers in the Senate, Obama announced his willingness to 
drop the public option from the fi nal reform bill. Accardi ngly, 
the bill that made it out of the Senate did not have this fea-
ture, and House Democrats grumblingly reconciled them-
selves to this reality. 
Aside from compromising and including congressio-
nal Democrats in the project of health care reform, the 
other striking difference was the approach of the Obama 
administration and traditional advocates of national health 
insurance toward groups normally opposed to reform. 
Instead of trying to freeze out health care stakeholders as 
the Clintons had done, the president brought key interest 
groups to the negotiating table early on. The hope was to 
forge a consensus on the content of reform that could with-
stand the onslaught from opponents of reform that was 
certain to follow during the long and tortuous legislative 
process. The strategy of stakeholder inclusion consisted of 
two parts. T he firs t was bringing interest groups to the table 
as genuine negotiating partners. The second was the mobi-
lization of a powerful and unified interest group coalition 
that brought together previous foes who were now deter-
mined to see reform through. 
The effort to win over powerful interests that had 
blocked past efforts at national h ealth insurance was not 
just the administration's purview. Rather, Obama relied on 
key politicians and interest group leaders as well. Senator 
Edward "Ted" Kennedy (D -MA; in office 1962-2009), a 
longtime advocate of universal health coverage who was 
suffering from terminal brain can cer, held closed-door 
talks with major health care stakeholders, many of whom 
had bitterly opposed the Clinton plan, to see if he could 
build a consensus on a new health care reform effort that 
would expand access to insurance and control costs. Health 
insurers and providers were attracted to gaining new mar-
kets among the uninsured, while employers wanted a solu-
tion to their skyrocketing labor costs. 12 In May 2009, 
Obama announced the outlines of a breakthrough with 
major health care stakeholders. In a letter addressed to the 
president, the interest groups pledged to work together to 
slow the rate of health care inflation by 1.5 percent in the 
decade from 2010 through 2019. The list of participants at 
the announcement was a who's-who of the medical indus-
tria l complex: the AMA; the AHA; the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA); the 
Advanced Medical Technology Association, which repre-
sented medical device manufacturers; America's Health 
Insurance Plans (AHIP) representing health insurance 
companies large and small; and the Service Employees' 
In ternational Union (SETU). Published in The New York 
Times on May 11, 2009, the letter noted, in part: 
We are committed to taking action in public-private 
partnership to create a more stable and sustainable 
health care system that will achieve billions in savings 
through: 
Implementing proposals in aU sectors of the health 
care system, focusing on administrative simplification, 
standardization, and transparency that supports effective 
markets; 
Reducing over-use and under-use of health care by 
aligning quality and efficiency incentives among provid-
ers across the continuum of care so that physicians, 
hospitals, and other health care providers are encour-
aged and enabled to work together towards the highest 
standards of quality and efficiency; 
Encouraging coordinated care, both in the public 
and private sectors, and adherence to evidence-based 
best practices and therapies that reduce hospitalization, 
manage chronic disease more efficiently and effectively, 
and implement proven clin ical prevention strategies; 
and, 
Reducing the cost of doing business by addressing 
cost drivers in each sector and through common sense 
improvements in care delivery models, health informa-
tion technology, workforce deployment and develop-
ment, and regulatory reforms. 
None of the groups specified what exactly they would 
do to reach this ambitious goal but instead pledged to work 
with the presiden t and each other to get there. All realized, 
however, that they would have to accept some responsibility 
for financing the expansion of coverage to the uninsured. It 
was in their self-interest to do so, as fewer uninsured trans-
lated into more certain incomes for providers and new 
markets for insurers.H 
Interestingly, the person instrumental in bringing rep-
resentatives of the health care industry to the agreement in 
May 2009 was not one of their own but Dennis Rivera, who 
led the health care reform campaign of the powerful SEIU 
II 
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and saw affordable employment-based insurance as vital to 
preserving union jobs. Thus, Rivera got employers (includ-
ing Wal-Mart), health care providers, and insurers on board 
with health care reform. The SEIV's president, Andy Stern 
(himself a maverick reformist labor leader on the left wing 
of the labor movement, who had taken his union out of the 
AFL-CIO in 2005 over differences in organized labor's strat-
egy), justified his union's strategy to forge an alliance on 
health care reform with traditional labor foes: 
If the business community, the pharmaceutical industry 
and Wal-Mart all opposed health care reform, this bill 
would be dead .... What keeps it alive is that conserva-
tives are isolated from their traditional business base. 
The business community appreciates that ow- country 
needs to do something about health care.44 
The Obama administration and its Democratic allies 
in Congress offered key concessions to providers, insurers, 
and employers in order to prevent a repetition of their 
obstruction that had been so damaging to the fate of Health 
Security in 1994. One by one, their associations cut deals 
with the administration. In some cases, the deals were sweet, 
in other cases, they were not. The pharmaceutical industry 
was the first to move. PhRMA agreed to close the gap in 
Medicare Part D drug coverage insurance (the so-called 
donut hole) by granting discounts of 50 percent for name-
brand drugs and promising to spend $150 million in ads 
supportive of health care reform. In return, Obama agreed 
to keep many of the Medicare Part D provisions that would 
maintain the hefty profit margins of the industry. Under the 
PPACA, the Medicare program would not be able to negoti-
ate drug prices with manufacturers or reimport cheaper 
prescription medicines from abroad. 
Like the pharmaceutical industry, other provider 
groups made concessions in exchange for new revenues that 
an expansion of coverage to the millions of uninsured would 
bring them. The AMA publicly came out in favor of the 
House version of reform on the eve of that chamber's vote. 
The association was relieved at Obama's subsequent deci -
sion to drop the public option. Many of the AM A's members 
were well acquainted with the lower Medicare reimburse-
ments compared with those of private insurers and feared 
that a public option would do the same for their treatment 
of working-age Americans. Hospitals, too, were satisfied 
with the elimination of the public option for similar reasons 
as physicians. To be sure, the AHA had to give some ground. 
Hospitals agreed to cuts in government reimbursements of 
$155 billion over ten years in order to finance the expansion 
of coverage to the uninsured. Fewer uninsured meant fewer 
cases of uncompensated charity care for the hospitals to 
bear. However, the AHA successfully negotiated a ten-year 
exemption from the introduction of such cuts. 
Reje<ting the Publi< Option 
Obama's decision to jettison the public option was crucial to 
neutralizing the health insurance lobby, represented by AHIP, 
a merger of AAHP and HIAA. Private insurers feared and 
loathed the public option because it posed a real threat to 
their profit margins and perhaps their survival. Indeed, AHIP 
complained that the public option would enjoy unfair advan-
tages in the marketplace and would essentially drive it out of 
business. Obama's decision to drop the public option, how-
ever, came with a price: insurers had to accept the prohibition 
of their medical underwriting practices that had allowed 
them to shun less healthy individuals and small businesses 
that employed them. At the same time, Obama and the insur-
ance industry found common ground on the need for the 
individual mandate. Insurance reform entailed that insurance 
companies would have to accept all applicants and set modi-
fied corrununity-rated premiums in place of those based on 
an applicant's health risk. Yet placing new requirements on 
insurance companies without also requiring everyone to buy 
insurance would Likely lead to adverse selection, a problem 
long recognized by many health economists. That is, sicker 
i11dividuals who had been denied coverage or priced out of 
the health insurance market would now rush to sign up for 
insurance. Without healthier people enrolling and offsetting 
these bad risks, the profits and even survival of insurers 
might be threatened. By requiring everybody to carry health 
insurance, the individual mandate would ensure the risk 
pooling necessary to the proper functioning of insurance 
markets. The provision for risk-adjusted payments among 
insurers was also expected to correct for any subtle forms of 
cream-skimming that insurance companies might try. 
Despite these concessions, the insurance industry was 
unhappy with the direction of negotiations with congressio-
nal Democrats and the administration. AHIP argued that its 
members had already agreed to cuts in reimbursement for the 
private Medicare plans they offered to seniors. While AHIP 
recognized the new business that covering thirty million 
uninsured would bring in, it disagreed with the Democrats' 
estin1ates and maintained that it would impose hardship on 
insurers. However, it proved difficult for the insurance indus-
try to plead hardship under the provisions of the PPACA. 
After all, the industry had enjoyed ample profits for a number 
of years. When AHIP tried to mount a campaign to sabotage 
the passage of the bill, its efforts seemed disingenuous and 
self-serving. An AHIP-commissioned analysis of the PPACA 
by the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers found that 
the law would lead to much higher premiums than the gov-
ernment had indicated. However, the accounting firm later 
distanced itself from the report and news media exposed its 
flawed data. Nor did it help that Anthem announced a pre-
mium hike of 30 percent for the small-group market. The 
insurance industry's position was increasingly untenable. 
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Concessions to Employers 
The Obama administration also made a number of key con-
cessions to employers that muted their opposition to reform. 
Chief among these was the requirement that responsibility 
for insurance rest with individuals rather than employers. 
The decision to forgo an employer mandate assuaged the 
fears of many firms over their labor costs. So, too, did the 
exemption of small firms from the play-or-pay provisions of 
the law as well as the reward of tax credits to small busi-
nesses that opted to provide insurance anyway. These provi-
sions satisfied most large employers. To be sure, the NIFB 
and U.S. Chamber of Commerce were vocal in their opposi-
tion to the PPACA and ran negative ads on the law. 
However, Obama's accommodations to employers' concerns 
made business opposition to reform less convincing, and, in 
fact, many large employers (and even some small ones) sup-
ported the PPACA:15 
The second prong in the reform strategy was engaging 
grassroots supporters of reform in coordinated action. This 
was in effect a continuation of the mobilization of the elec-
torate that had swept Obama into office in 2008; the leading 
groups in this issue-based campaign centering on health 
care reform were Health Care for America Now (HCAN), 
Organizing for America (OFA), and MoveOn. These groups 
coordinated their work and that of other groups favoring 
reform, such as groups representing segments of the medical 
profession as well as nurses and other allied health profes-
sions, labor unions, and consumer groups. HCAN and OFA 
organized rallies, circulated Internet petitions, and garnered 
online contributions to finance this issue campaign. These 
tactics sustained ordinary citizens' support for health care 
reform and targeted congressional Democrats in vulnerable 
districts whose votes for the PPACA were not assured. For 
example, in 2009, volunteers at a phone bank in Wisconsin 
called registered Democratic voters living in Ohio whose 
representative was wavering on reform and whose reelection 
was not assured. The phone bank volunteer would explain 
the PPACA to that member's constituents and urge them to 
vote for their incumbent representative in the upcoming 
election. This type of mobilization was designed to keep 
Democratic politicians honest and minimize their defec-
tions from the PPACA. 
The mobilization of grassroots supporters succeeded 
on a number of levels. First, proponents of reform would not 
let differences of opinion destroy health care reform efforts 
as they had in the past. Though some groups such MoveOn 
and the AFL-CIO initially pushed hard for the public 
option, when President Obama made it clear that he would 
not sacrifice the entire reform project for the preservation of 
this one idea, they acquiesced. Moreover, they continued to 
rally their members to support reform and to pressure con-
gressional Democrats to do the same. Their efforts paid off, 
with Congress just barely enacting the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act in March 2010. 
Impact of the Tea Party Movement 
The pro-reform coalition faced a formidable array of groups 
that mobilized to kill the bill, but not primarily from the 
insurance or provider groups. Instead, the main challenge 
came from the Tea Party movement. The Tea Party move-
ment was not an organized interest group as such, nor was 
it a political party. Rather, it was a conservative bacldash that 
developed among citizens and erstwhile Republicans in 
reaction to that party's fiscal profligacy and bank bailouts 
under President George W Bush (2001 -2009). It consisted 
largely of higher income white Americans. They generally 
abhorred big government and especially the Democrats' 
health care reform plans. While many Tea Party adherents 
formed spontaneously among grassroots citizens, the move-
ment was also supported financially and otherwise by pow-
erful conservative elites, such as former Republican 
representative Dick Armey's Freedom Works and the con-
servative industrialist Koch brothers.46 Tea Partiers engaged 
in a number of actions to try to stop health care reform. In 
summer 2009, they disrupted town hall meetings, which 
Democrats had organized to explain and build public sup-
port for Obama's reform plans. 
Tea Partiers were very effective in shouting down 
speakers and garnering widespread media coverage in the 
process. In addition to such direct action, the Tea Party 
movement sought to reorient the Republican Party by run-
n ing conservative candidates in Republican primaries for 
Congress and the presidency. Rather than form a break-
away th ird party, the Tea Party movement intended to 
infiltrate the Republican Party in order to steer it back to 
its true small-government roots. Though failing to block 
the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Tea Party candidates did well enough to help the 
Republicans regain control of the House of Representatives 
in the 2010 midterm elections; however, they fell short of 
their aim to retake the White House or the Senate in the 
2012 elections. 
Critics of the Administration's Strategy 
Critics of the strategy of securing interest group buy-in 
charged that it was little more than Democrats selling out 
their principles and buying off their foes. Clearly, health care 
providers, insurers, and employers look set to do well under 
the new law. Defenders of this approach, however, argued 
that it was simply a matter of political necessity, that it was 
far better for the Democrats to transform traditional foes of 
health care reform into allies by means of inclusion and co-
optation. However, such a strategy required compromise, by 
many pro-reform leaders and their supporters. 
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It also remains to be seen whether the deals struck with 
health care stakeholders during the enactment of the PPACA 
will hold. Having fai led to gain Republican majorities that 
could repeal the law outright, the Tea Party's strategy has 
been to pressure congressional Republicans to block the 
health care reform law either by delaying its implementation 
or by defunding the law's key provisions. The Tea Party pre-
cipitated a partial federal government shutdown in October 
2013 with its insistence on delaying implementation of the 
PPACA. Providers and insurers may seek to renegotiate or 
renege on earlier agreements they struck with the Obama 
administration. Medical device manufacturers pressured 
House Republicans to include a repeal of the tax on their 
equipment in their ultimatum on the shutdown in fall 2013, 
though the measure did not make it through the Democratic-
controlled Senate. Wishing to preempt an electoral backlash 
in the 2014 congressional elections, the Obama administra-
tion decided to delay by one year the introduction of the 
play-or-pay provisions for large employers. 
HEALTH CARE POLICY: GOING FORWARD 
Health care policy in the United States amply illustrates the 
hyperpluralism of the interest group universe, which has 
become more crowded with the ascendancy of interest 
group campaign donations and lobbying in U.S. politics. It is 
also the result of the unplanned development of employ-
ment-based private insurance and the tacking on of public 
insurance programs for the poor and elderly later on. The 
result is a health policy arena full of narrow interests with a 
stake in preserving the status quo. A radical policy shift in 
this environment is extremely unlikelyY Instead, health care 
reformers have had to build on the existing edifice of private 
and public insurance, even if those twin pillars are showing 
the limits of their ability to uphold the system. 
The sheer number of competing groups, even within a 
specific sector of the economy, poses enormous difficulty 
for policymakers seeking to forge a compromise agreement. 
Such agreements, while rare, do happen. They depend on 
The Repeal of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act 
In 1989, Congress enacted the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA). The law would have ext·~nded Medicare coverage of hospital and doctor bills above a certain 
threshold. To pay for these new benefits, wealthier seniors would have faced higher premiums. AARP initially supported the bill but reversed its position after encounter-
ing a backlash from Its own members. The ensuing opposition from both AARP and the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare led Congress to repeal 
the law the following year. Representative Donald L. Ritter (R-PA) introduced the bi ll to repeal the MCCA on January 3, 1989: 
Mr. RITTER. Mr. Speaker, since its passage, I haven't heard one of the 72 Members who voted against the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act express regret 
over their vote, but I've heard complaints from many of those who are sorry they voted for it. 
lately, we've been reading more financial reports advising senior citizens on how to adjust their incomes in 1989 to reduce their tax liabilities. They are com-
ing up with clever strategies to avoid paying the new surtax on their income tax that was imposed on them to pay for a Catastrophic Coverage Act they didn't 
want. But, this is one New Year's gift from Congress which taxpaying seniors fi nd unwelcome. 
In reducing tax liabilities to avoid the surtax, taxpaying seniors will withdraw moneys available for benefits. I'd like to ask my colleagues if they know that 
the Catastrophic Coverage Act contains a provision requiring that"The Secretary would increase the flat premium to replace revenue" in the case of a revenue 
shortfall. I fear this might result in not only higher Medicare part B payments, but also higher deductibles, lower levels of service and fewer people covered. 
The funding mechanism is self-defeating .... At a time when society is craving greater savings and investment by seniors to cover retirement expenses, the 
Medicare Catastrophic Act is a mistake. It's a raw deal for seniors who have saved and invested wisely for their later years. Not only will they have to pay 
income taxes, but also new surcharges on those taxes for a bi ll that doesn't even encompass long-term care. 
My constituents are writing and call ing my office to protest the surtax and the sharp increases in Medicare part B. I understand that's happening in other 
congressional districts, too. The financing mechanisms in the bill are onerous for our tax-paying senior citizens, given the inevitable reduction of taxable 
income and assets, they sow the seeds of their own failure. For these reasons, I am introducing a bill to repeal the Medicare Catastrophic Act of 1988 and to 
establish a bipartisan advisory group to study and develop proposals to provide protection against excessive costs of catastrophic illness beyond the scope of 
current Medicare coverage. 
SOURCE: "Introduction of the Bill to Repeal the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1989-Hon. Don Ritter (Extension of Remarks-January 03, 1989); Con· 
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political and interest group leaders willing to engage in 
meaningful bargaining with each other and able to bring 
their base along. When reform does occur, it is invariably 
drawn out and ugly. Yet such is the pattern of interest group 
politics in the United States today. 
See also Chapter 6: The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (1965-Present); Chapter 19: 
Children's Health and Health Care Policy (1960s-
Present); Chapter 20: Women's Issues and American 
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